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abstract
This article examines the emergence of city-region governance as a specific state 
spatial selectivity in post-reform China. The process has been driven by the state in 
response to the crisis of economic decentralization, and to vicious inter-city competition 
and uncoordinated development. As part of the recentralization of state power, the 
development of urban clusters (chengshiqun) as interconnected city-regions is now a 
salient feature of ‘new urbanization’ policy. I argue in this article that the Chinese city-
region corresponds to specific logics of scale production. Economic globalization has led 
to the development of local economies and further created the need to foster ‘regional 
competitiveness’. To cope with regulatory deficit at the regional level, three mechanisms 
have been orchestrated by the state: administrative annexation, spatial plan preparation 
and regional institution building, which reflect recent upscaling in post-reform governance.
introduction
The concept of urban clusters (chengshiqun) has recently resurfaced in China. 
The notion has existed in Chinese geography for a long time, mainly originating from 
the study of urban systems (see e.g. Yao et al., 1992), but recently it has been picked up 
in government policies either to build stronger coalitions for regional competitiveness 
or to solve the over-concentration of growth in large central cities. For example, in an 
effort to find solutions for the problems of smog and population over-concentration, 
in 2014 the new Chinese leader Xi Jinping called for a regional approach to the future 
development of Beijing in the capital region, known as Jing-Jin-Ji, which led to immense 
interest in city-region governance. In March 2015, the central government approved 
the outline of the Jing-Jin-Ji Collaborative Development Plan, which indicated that the 
notion of the urban cluster had become an official term in governance and had become 
popularized. In May 2016 the State Council approved the Yangtze River Delta Urban 
Cluster Development Plan. However, the term chengshiqun is used quite flexibly and is 
only vaguely defined in Chinese. Another concept, that of the metropolitan interlocking 
region (MIR), initially proposed by Zhou (1991), has not been used much. While MIR 
is similar to the mega-region or megalopolis (Gottmann, 1961), chengshiqun in practice 
refers to the city-region within the larger MIR. Thus, the city-region consists of the 
core city and its surrounding areas, such as its suburban areas and outskirts. Several 
adjacent city-regions then form an extended urbanized area such as the MIR. In China, 
these two scales are closely related: the Jing-Jin-Ji, the Yangtze River Delta (YRD) and 
the Pearl River Delta (PRD) are highly populated areas of an MIR with interlocking 
city-regions. In short, the Jing-Jin-Ji, the YRD and the PRD themselves are not a single 
city-region but rather a cluster of city-regions situated adjacent to each other.
The development of Chinese city-regions seems to echo a new spatial form of 
city-region in advanced capitalist economies (Scott, 2001). Originally, city-regionalism 
is mainly regarded as having emerged as a result of globalization and consequently of 
the global economy. However, some scholars (Jonas and Ward, 2002; 2007; Jonas 2012; 
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Jonas et al., 2014) argue that the formation of city-region governance is a deliberate 
process of scale building, which involves both state and non-state actors (Harrison and 
Hoyler, 2014). Brenner’s (1999; 2004) seminal research on ‘state spatiality’ describes 
how the rise of regional governance can be broadly understood as a process of ‘state 
reterritorialization’, and the specific form of the city-region as ‘state spatial selectivity’, 
which means that a specific scale has been chosen or built by the state. The ‘new 
region alism’, which goes beyond individual cities, is created through the ‘politics of 
distribution’ (Jonas and Pincetl, 2006). In the US, participatory and partnership models 
of governance were developed to tackle the challenges of urban growth resulting from 
exclusive local growth machine politics. Consequently, the ‘new civic regionalism’, as 
it is called, has been rolled out by those who have large-scale business interests and 
has led to the reorganization of local and state government powers at the scale of city-
regions. The current literature seems to be useful as it reveals the role of state and 
non-state actors in external processes––that is, the particular scale is being chosen 
through local and regional politics. However, how this process is actually unfolding 
remains a theoretical assumption. In non-Western contexts, we know very little about 
its applicability.
The thesis of state rescaling and state spatiality has been examined in non-
Western contexts (Park, 2013), in particular in the transformation of the East Asian 
developmental state (Park et al., 2012). This emerging form of governance is seen as 
selective liberalization in response to the challenge of nation-state-centred devel-
opmentalism or the developmental state (Park, 2013). Similarly, in Brazil the recently 
rolled-out development state focuses on the ‘metropolitan scale as both a projected 
space and a privileged arena to implement their political agenda’ (Klink, 2013: 1183). 
Both studies highlight the importance of city-regions.
Against this background, this article adopts the theoretical perspective of city-
region governance, in particular regarding the specificities of the new form of state 
spatial selectivity at the city-region scale. I must emphasize that the intention of this 
article is not to conduct an empirical case study, as a vast literature on Chinese regional 
governance is currently becoming available, although these studies tend to focus on 
specific local issues. There is thus a clear need to build upon the literature of Chinese 
economic decentralization and urban entrepreneurialism (Xu and Yeh, 2005; Wu and 
Zhang, 2007; Chien and Gordon, 2008) and recent upscaling studies (Lin, 2009; Li and 
Wu, 2012a; 2012b; Li et al., 2014; Ye, 2014) to ascertain whether state spatiality applies 
to China and what its limitations may be. This article’s original contribution lies on two 
fronts. First, it provides a nuanced understanding of rescaling beyond decentralization 
and more accurate periodization, which identifies a recentralization process that has 
been neglected in empirical studies. Secondly, this article contextualizes specific state 
spatial selectivity in China as crisis management, hence leading to a better understanding 
of the key role of the state in the process of forming city-region governance. Rather 
than seeing this selectivity as a democratization process (Purcell, 2007), as a task to 
manage social provision (Jonas et al., 2014) or as a form of regionalist politics (Park, 
2013), we explain the continuation of state governance in the strategically selected city-
regional space. This article provides a comparative conceptual framework of perio d-
ization (Brenner, 2004) for understanding this process of city-region building while 
highlighting the role of the state within this process.
Literature review and conceptual framework
— State spatial selectivity and city-regionalism
The formation of the global city-region (Scott, 2001; Scott and Storper, 2003) 
raises the question of ‘scale building’ in advanced capitalism (Jonas and Ward, 2007). 
The politics of rescaling suggests that rescaling is not simply a matter of decentralization 
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or upscaling of state functions to a larger scale (Cox, 2009). A growing body of literature 
suggests that the politics of distribution rather than globalization is responsible for 
creating city-regions––and for the state selecting the city-region as scale (Jonas, 2012; 
Jonas et al., 2014). For example, the city-region is imagined, pursued and created for 
various purposes to deal with the social reproduction of workers, communities and 
neighbourhoods (Gough, 2002) or with social and environmental problems largely in 
regional forms (McCann, 2007). These are more broadly described as ‘spatial practices’ 
(Jonas, 2006).
In the US, city-regionalism is produced to answer to the need to organize 
the collective provision of social and physical infrastructure while at the same time 
maintaining the competitiveness of the neoliberal state (Jonas et al., 2014). In the UK, 
the new spaces of governance aim at collective provision fulfilment, while also coping 
with growth pressure (While et al., 2004). Purcell (2007) argues that regionalism is 
asso ciated with advocating democracy to counter growth politics, as participatory 
democracy is intrinsically associated with regionally presented politics. The literature 
of rescaling has been much enriched by other studies too. The downscaling of gov-
ernance is now seen as the emergence of ‘new state space’ (Brenner, 2004) rather than 
as the absence of state influence. Actors pursue their strategic interests and represent 
practical motivations on the regionalism agenda (McGuirk, 2007). Local governance 
can be seen as the assemblage of state power (Allen and Cochrane, 2010), and according 
to Ward and Jonas (2004: 2135), ‘competitive city-regionalism is best understood as an 
on-going struggle for control of space rather than a new emergent form of capitalist 
territorial competition and development’. In terms of Hall and Pain’s (2006) description, 
there are multiple state and non-state actors in large polycentric city-regions, and hence 
city-region governance is fragile (Harrison and Hoyler, 2014). All these studies seem to 
suggest the need for understanding the concrete processes of city-region building.
— State spatial selectivity and the comparison of two sets of periodization
While the Western experience of state spatial selectivity and its periodization is 
useful for deriving a conceptual framework for understanding Chinese city-region 
governance, the value of comparison lies in that it does not suggest Chinese exception-
alism. Rather, it provides a more nuanced understanding of the Chinese state and its 
operations. The specific form of state spatial selectivity is contingent upon specific 
histories and geographies. Within Western economies, diversity still exists: for example, 
in their work on Canadian cities, Boudreau et al. (2007) compare the consolidated 
Toronto and Montreal city-regions and examine the relationship between civil society 
and metropolitan institutions under different Francophone and Anglophone traditions. 
They found that while Toronto pursued a more entrepreneurial approach to reach 
regional consensus around growth, Montreal tended towards a state-centred strategy. 
Recently, state spatial selectivity has been fruitfully examined in non-Western contexts 
too (Klink, 2013; Park, 2013; Tsukamoto, 2012). While rescaling is the common feature, 
the form of rescaling differs markedly in different contexts. For example, in Japan, 
rescaling means that the Japanese developmental state no longer pursues a balanced 
national growth pattern: the Tokyo city-region now reveals the outcome of a rescaled 
state system (Tsukamoto, 2012). In Brazil, in turn, the national developmental regime 
has seen up-, down- and re-scaled competitive state spaces in the metropolitan region 
(Klink, 2013).
Within the literature of rescaling, Brenner (2004) explicitly proposes a frame-
work of periodization of state spatial selectivity (see Table 1). He conceptualizes shifting 
selectivity as a series of crises and crisis management (Brenner, 2004), which describes 
changes from spatial Keynesianism and Fordism to new rounds of ‘glocalization’. 
Interestingly, the framework suggests a subtle difference between the initial stage of 
glocalization in the 1980s, characterized by a focus on strategic urban regions, and the 
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second stage in the 1990s, aimed at building larger regions through regionalization. 
While the terms Keynesianism and Fordism reflect geographical specificity and are not 
applicable to China, the periodization implies that rescaling is an outcome of major 
conflicts and contradictions. Similarly, in the framework for Chinese state spatial 
selectivity that follows, I divide forms of state spatial selectivity into different historical 
formations of socialism and its reform.
— Periodization of Chinese state spatial selectivity
The literature on advanced capitalism and other non-Western contexts pro-
vides two important points of understanding: first, scale building is a political process 
beyond the necessity of globalization; and secondly, the particular selectivity of state 
spatiality depends upon geographical specificity and the history of state governance. 
These two points are relevant to Chinese state spatiality. China has been an authoritar-
ian  state since 1949, and the national scale has been dominant. The state was con-
cerned with regional inequalities (Fan, 1997; Wei, 2000) through regional policies, but 
increasingly the focus has shifted to growing cities as the drivers for national devel-
opment (Xu and Yeh, 2005; Zhang and Wu, 2006; Lin, 2009; Wei et al., 2009).
The city-region was formed in the context of Chinese economic decentraliza-
tion and the effort to reverse this trend. Market-oriented reform triggered downward 
rescaling and the rise of entrepreneurialism became centred on the country’s central 
cities (Zhang and Wu, 2006; Shen, 2007; Chien and Gordon, 2008; Yang and Wang, 2008; 
Li and Wu, 2012a; 2012b). In the YRD, traditionally characterized by close economic 
linkage and regional culture, market reform led to localism and local competition (Chien 
and Gordon, 2008). For example, Guangzhou strove to compete with Shenzhen and 
Hong Kong to reposition itself in the PRD region (Xu and Yeh, 2005).
Besides the literature of inter-city competition and downward rescaling, recent 
studies on emerging regional governance have begun to reveal changes in regional gov-
ernance (Zhang, 2006; Yeh and Xu, 2010; Li and Wu, 2012a; Ye, 2014). The YRD began to 
consider inter-city collaboration to build a competitive region (Zhang, 2006). Confronted 
with inter-city competition, the PRD recently emphasized regional coordination (Yeh 
and Xu, 2010). Core cities began to annex nearby cities, and many counties were turned 
into urban districts in the 2000s. The development of the PRD shows a strong pattern 
of regional growth (Lin, 2009) and the integration of cities has become a new strategy, 
in which the state plays a leading role (Ye, 2014). Jiangsu, for example, experimented 
with inter-city cooperation (Luo and Shen, 2009), and the subnational regional plan 
table 1 Changing state spatial selectivity in advanced capitalism
historical Formation
Form of state spatial 
selectivity
Form of Urban–
regional regulation
major Conflicts and 
Contradictions
Spatial Keynesianism: early 
1960s to early 1970s
National state, regional 
policies; municipal 
institutions
Managerialism, collective 
consumption
Urban growth poles; 
central state subsidies
Fordism in crisis: early 1970s  
to early 1980s
Balanced national growth; 
addressing declining 
industrial regions
Pressure for redistribution; 
local policies
Fiscal crisis; political 
conflicts
Glocalization Round I: 1980s Regeneration of local 
economies; strategic urban 
regions
Entrepreneurial city; 
retrenchment of welfare; 
abolishment of municipal 
institutions
Inequality; zero-sum 
competition
Glocalization Round II: 1990s 
to present
Rescaling; larger regions 
rather than the city; 
regionalization
Competitive regionalism; 
city-region; crisis 
management
Upscaling of urban 
problems; governance 
failure; unsolved at a 
national scale
SOURCE: Simplified adaptation of Brenner (2004: 479–80)
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became the focus of new experiments (Luo and Shen, 2008). The call for more strategic 
regional development means that the central state tries to maintain its leadership in 
regional development, especially through powerful ministries (such as the Ministry 
of Land and Resources), which allocate land development quotas (Xu et al., 2009). 
The central government thus encourages provincial and local governments to formulate 
a metropolitan strategy that focuses on collaboration rather than competition, as 
shown in the integration of the two cities of Guangzhou and Foshan in the PRD region 
(Ye, 2014). In regional infrastructure projects such as railway development, interaction 
between the central government (the ministries) and local governments has become 
essential (Li et al., 2014). However, available case studies have not revealed concrete 
mechanisms of region building.
Based on the literature of state spatiality selectivity in advanced capitalism, this 
article divides Chinese governance into the following phases: state socialism (1949–
1978), early market reform (1979–2000) and post-WTO (World Trade Organization) 
market society (2001 to the present) (see Table 2). Accordingly, the specific form 
of state spatial selectivity during the phase of state socialism was the national scale, 
characterized by a centrally planned economy. Its form of urban–regional regulation 
was based on state managerialism, which was achieved through hierarchical planning 
coordination. Planning commissions were the major regulatory bodies that allocated 
resources and defined development targets. Its major contradiction was urban–rural 
dualism, because, although the whole territory was subject to an authoritarian state, 
the rural areas were left largely underdeveloped and insulated from the urban indus-
trial sector, which was supported by the state. During the early stage of market reform, 
through economic decentralization, state spatiality was at the scale of the central cities. 
This period was characterized by rising urban entrepreneurialism and the devolution 
of planning control to individual cities and even their districts, which led to fierce inter-
city competition and uncoordinated development. From 2001, when China joined WTO, 
a new form of state spatiality emerged, on which this research focuses and which will 
be examined in detail in the section that follows. While economic decentralization in 
the early stage of economic reform has been referred to in the literature, this upscaling 
towards city-regions has not been fully examined, although there are a few studies (see 
Hsing, 2010; Xu and Yeh, 2010). The mechanisms for achieving upscaling are admin-
istrative annexation that strengthens the metropolitan region rather than central cities, 
spatial plans initiated by the central state to maintain its regulatory control, and soft 
regional institutions built through inter-city negotiations. A major contradiction in this 
state spatial selectivity is that it is adopted as a spatial fix, because the new form is 
largely state-orchestrated and lacks a regional identity, and civil society is not developed 
around this city-region scale. The ‘politics of redistribution’ outside the state sector are 
table 2 Changing state spatial selectivity in China: a conceptual framework
historical Formation
Form of state spatial 
selectivity
Form of Urban–
regional regulation
major Conflicts and 
Contradictions
State socialism: 1949–1978 The national scale of 
statehood as overarching 
governance
Managerialism achieved 
through hierarchical 
planning coordination in a 
planned economy
Urban–rural dualism
Early market reformist 
regime: 1979–2001
Rising localities; dominance 
of large cities
Urban entrepreneurialism; 
devolution of planning 
control
Fierce inter-city competition; 
uncoordinated and 
redundant developments
Post-WTO market society: 
2001 to present
Upscaling towards the city-
region
Administrative annexation; 
spatial plans; regional 
institutions
Lack of regional identity; 
state imposed rescaling
SOURCE: Simplified adaptation of Wu and Zhang (2010: 61)
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not fully developed to drive the formation of city-region governance and the govern-
ance of the city-region is still a state-imposed administrative process. The state tries 
to build city-regions but at the same time its deep involvement becomes an obstacle to 
further regional integration.
shifting state spatial selectivity
— The impact of urban entrepreneurialism
Economic decentralization in the 1990s led to a new central–local relationship 
and to fiscal autonomy for local governments (Wong, 1991; Walder, 1995; Zhang 1999). 
In economic terms, China was arguably de facto federalist (Qian and Weingast, 1997). 
Local governments were faced by a much more defined budget line than in the previous 
phase and had to balance their budgets. If they managed to generate additional reve-
nue, they were allowed to retain it for local use. The consequence of fiscal reform was 
that local governments acted more like a firm (Walder, 1995), which gave rise to local 
entrepreneurialism (Wu, 2003; Chien and Gordon, 2008; Lin, 2009). In addition, land 
reform in the 2000s greatly incentivized local governments to initiate land development 
as an extra-budgetary source of revenue, leading to land-based local development (Yang 
and Wang, 2008; Hsing, 2010). Administrative adjustment, in particular the adoption 
of ‘city-leading-counties’ system, significantly consolidated the power of the core city 
(Ma, 2005). Urban entrepreneurialism drove the city to expand its territory, to enter 
into coalitions with development partners and to compete with other cities in order 
to gain the central position in the region (Zhang, 2002; Xu and Yeh, 2005; Zhang and 
Wu, 2006; Chien and Gordon, 2008; Lin, 2009; Ye, 2014). From the 1990s onwards, 
hierarchical control weakened. Rising local entrepreneurialism was mainly urban-
based. Development priorities shifted from the inland areas to the coastal regions and 
uneven regional redevelopment was tolerated and justified more widely for the sake 
of economic growth (Fan, 1997). As a result, redistributive regional policy was phased 
out and a new regional governance became centred on the urban areas (Wu and Zhang, 
2010; Li and Wu, 2012a).
The rise of urban entrepreneurialism created an impact on the city-region. First, 
rapid urban expansion into the whole municipal territory meant that the central city 
became closely linked with its peripheral areas and suburban counties to form the 
metro politan area. Before this massive urban expansion, the suburbs of Chinese cities 
were in essence rural and mostly supplied food and vegetables for the central city. Land-
driven urban development promoted urban redevelopment in the central areas and 
mass residential relocation into the suburbs. The development of new towns facilitated 
suburban industrial growth, while the central areas were redeveloped for official and 
commercial use. This happened in conjunction with efforts to build global cities. This 
process of ‘metropolitanization’ transformed the relationship between the central city 
and its suburbs from one characterized by scattered industrial satellite towns with a 
vast rural area for vegetable cultivation to one of suburban new towns and a globalizing 
central area that formed a unified global city-region.
The growth of the global city-region under urban entrepreneurialism is evident 
in Shanghai and its environs. In the 1990s, Shanghai adopted a strategy to develop the 
Pudong area. Since 2001, Shanghai had been creating a new city-region strategy to 
develop ‘one city and nine new towns’, which led to rapid suburban industrial devel-
opment. The suburban district of Songjiang, for example, has seen massive residential 
development, as well the development of a university town and industrial parks 
(Shen and Wu, 2012). Subsequently, the core city areas have been upgraded for office 
and commercial use, while the suburbs have been industrialized to accommodate 
new global-oriented manufacturing industries (Shen and Wu, 2016). The division of 
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economic functions between the central city and suburban districts has thus led to the 
creation of a more metropolitan scale of development, and in essence this is the scale 
of the city-region.
Secondly, the impact of entrepreneurial governance on the city-region goes 
beyond its municipal boundaries. Cities now have to position themselves in their 
regions and fierce inter-city competition is evident from the rivalry between Shanghai 
and nearby cities in the Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces (Li and Wu, 2012b). Just 
outside the metropolitan area of Shanghai lies the county-level city of Kunshan, a rural 
county until 1990. Kunshan used its location near to Shanghai, its high-quality land 
and its flat topography to pioneer the use of foreign investment to initiate export-
oriented industrialization, which represented a new model of growth in the YRD. The 
rapid development of industrial land led to the transformation of the county territory 
into a municipal area. As a rural county, Kunshan’s built-up area had been very compact 
and had been concentrated in the small town of the county seat. The territory of the 
county was metropolitanized through industrial development in several towns, 
including the Kunshan Economic and Technological Development Zone and Huaqiao 
Business Park near the border with Shanghai. The development of Kunshan began to 
outdo Shanghai’s suburban districts of Songjiang and Jiading. To counter the advan-
tages the low-cost investment environment in Kunshan offered, the Shanghai munici-
pal government announced Project 173 in 2003, with the aim of attracting investment 
to an area of 173 square kilometres along the border with Kunshan (Zhang, 2006: 48). 
Jiangsu province, in turn, launched an industrial belt along the border with Shanghai 
(Li and Wu, 2012b). In some places, a ‘zero land price’ was introduced (Yang and Wang, 
2008). Development was driven by the GDP-ism associated with a cadre promotion 
system based on the GDP performance of localities (Chien and Gordon, 2008). The rise 
of entrepreneurialism drove previously unrelated or only loosely connected cities to 
compete, and their development strategies necessarily had to go beyond their territo-
ries to adopt a regional development approach. Inter-city competition thus gave rise to 
the governance of the city-region.
Thirdly, urban entrepreneurialism has driven extensive infrastructure devel-
opment in the metropolitan region and beyond. Cities began to compete to develop 
mega infrastructure projects such as deep-water ports, airports and highways to 
strengthen their status and position in terms of accessibility. For example, in the PRD, 
several airports and deep-water ports competed with each other (Xu and Yeh, 2005). In 
the YRD, Shanghai built its own deep-water port, while Zhejiang province wanted to 
develop Beilungang at Ningbo, and Jiangsu province tried to develop Taicang port and 
Nantong port, both located in its territory. To achieve its aim of becoming an interna-
tional  shipping centre, Shanghai built its own port at Yangshan Islands with a total 
investment of 100 billion yuan––much to the dismay of Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces, 
from which the new Shanghai port attracted potential cargo away. Infrastructure 
development even became a way to deter other cities from competing, while cementing 
a monopoly position for some cities in infrastructure provision (Zhang and Wu, 2006). 
For example, Shanghai’s Hongqiao International airport becoming a largely domestic 
airport had a devastating effect on nearby IT industries in Jiangsu province, a situation 
that improved only recently, when the Hongqiao transport hub was opened. The 
exten sion of line 11 of the Shanghai metro to Kunshan was fraught with extraordi-
nary difficulties: while the last station on the line was to be at Jiading district within 
Shanghai’s boundary, it was only through intervention of then top party leaders of 
Jiangsu province, Shanghai municipality and the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) that it became possible to extend it to connect with stations in the 
Huaqiao Business Park of Kunshan (Li and Wu, 2012b). Similarly, the development of 
the inter-city railway in the PRD and the Guangzhou–Foshan Metro involved complex 
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negotiations between governments across various scales from central government 
ministries and provincial governments down to local cities (Li et al., 2014). The recent 
development of high-speed trains, inter-city railways and metro line extensions has 
rapidly changed China’s accessibility map: the geographical scope of travel has been 
expanded, leading to a spill-over of economic activities and to a rise in the number 
of residents commuting across the boundaries of cities. The development of inter-city 
infrastructure has led to these cities becoming interlocking city-regions.
Fourthly, the regionalization of the economy did not lead to inter-city collab-
oration, but rather strengthened the fragmentation of governance at the regional scale. 
Local governments in the region pursued similar industries they deemed profitable. As 
a result, the industrial structures of the cities became rather similar. For example, most 
cities in the YRD aimed to develop export-oriented industries, based on the successful 
development of Suzhou and Wuxi. Eight out of 16 cities in the YRD selected petro-
chemical industries, 11 selected automobile parts manufacturing and 12 selected IT and 
communication equipment. Almost all cities along the Yangtze River, coastal Jiangsu 
and Hangzhou Bay proposed to develop similar export-oriented industries and thus 
competed for raw materials in the same markets. Because individual cities were acting 
as the agencies of development, they tended to race to the bottom to attract investment 
and compete for the market, which aggravated fragmentation. Similar industrial struc-
tures should not in themselves be a problem; nevertheless, such similar investment 
projects forced local governments to compete with each other. Inter-city competition 
and lack of regional coordination led to environmental degradation and excessive 
farmland development. In short, multiple jurisdictions in the region pursuing the same 
direction towards industrialization led to the regionalization of urban economies, while 
simultaneously contributing to the fragmentation of city-region governance.
Finally, competition-minded cities are seeking to merge with nearby jurisdic-
tions to increase their population size and development capacity. The central city often 
promotes a strategy of building an urban cluster or seeking alliances with nearby cities. 
This may or may not involve administrative annexation or adjustment; however, 
through spatial plans and unified service provision, it hopes to achieve ‘urban unifi-
cation’ (tongchenghua). Examples include the unification of twin cities such as Xi’an and 
Xianyang, Guangzhou and Foshan, Zhengzhou and Kanfeng (Zheng-Bian), Shenyang 
and Fushun, Hefei and Huainan, and the tri-cities of Shantou, Chaozhou and Jieyang. 
These strategies clearly have regional competitiveness in mind, based on their desire 
to enhance agglomeration effects. Nevertheless, the actual implementation often con-
fronts the complicated politics of scale production. For example, Guangdong province 
hoped that in Shantou, Chaozhou and Jieyang it could build a growth coalition to speed 
up economic growth in underdeveloped eastern Guangdong, because historically these 
three cities had been part of the same city before they were broken up. However, these 
cities took the opportunity provided by the provincial city-region agenda to seek their 
own growth advantages (Li et al., 2015) and progress towards a coalition has been slow 
because of inter-city politics.
Overall, the rise of urban entrepreneurialism has generated an impetus for 
grow ing cities larger and stronger beyond their boundaries, while regionalization of 
infrastructure and economies has made the scenario of the city-region a possibility. 
However, city-region governance cannot be assumed and is subject to the politics of 
scale production, to which I will turn in the next subsection.
— Regional economies and regulatory deficit
China has become the world’s factory since it joined the WTO in 2001. Economic 
globalization has driven the development of regional economies. According to Scott 
(2001), this process will lead to the formation of global city-regions. The operation of 
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the Chinese world factory seems to confirm Scott’s theory of the city-region, because 
production factors go beyond the territories of individual cities. For example, in terms 
of foreign investment, the border of Jiangsu and Shanghai is no longer an obstacle. 
The development of the automobile industry in Jiading district of Shanghai led to the 
creation of a dozen German factories across the border in Jiangsu province. The city 
of Taicang in Jiangsu province used this chance to set up a German industrial park 
to benefit from spill-over effects. Similarly, investment in information technology and 
communication (ITC) by Taiwanese investors is located in Kunshan and Suzhou inside 
Jiangsu province as well as in the industrial suburbs of Shanghai. In short, the new 
export manufacturing economy presents a regional scale.
In terms of labour force, rural migrant workers are mobile and not limited by 
the boundaries of individual cities. This is because they are not treated as residents of a 
particular city (Smart and Lin, 2007) and are thus not entitled to access social services 
at the scale of the specific city. The location choice of migrant workers is thus not a 
matter of individual cities but rather a comparison between regions, for example, the 
YRD versus the PRD. More interestingly, the shortage of rural migrant workers just 
before the global financial crisis in 2008 was at a regional scale, that is, widely across 
cities in the PRD.
Although Chinese manufacturing industries faced a decline in export in the 
wake of the 2008 crisis, they are associated with the global economy, and economic 
development under globalization saliently takes place at the regional scale. The clus ter-
ing of development zones, industrial districts and high-tech parks form the backbone 
of the regionalized industries. For example, in southern Jiansu, industrial parks exist 
in proximity to each other. From Shanghai to Nanjing, there are a number of industrial 
parks, including Kunshan Economic and Technological Development Zone, Suzhou 
New and High-tech District, China–Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park (CSSIP), Wuxi 
New and High-tech District, Changzhou High-tech District, and Nanjing Economic 
and Technological Development Zone. These industrial districts and parks adopt 
similar preferential policies towards investors and compete with each other through 
similar governance structures, for example, by providing one-stop services (Wei et al., 
2009).
Although the Chinese economy has become regionalized under economic 
glo balization, its regulatory approach is still based on competitive states and urban 
entre preneurialism (Wu, 2003; Chien and Gordon, 2008; Li and Wu, 2012a; Ye, 2014). 
This has created a regulatory deficit at the regional scale. The tension between the 
region alization of economic production and city-based governance has triggered a 
process of governance rescaling. The need to re-establish regional governance is accom-
panied by an overall shift of governance at the national scale. In the 2000s, the 
political ethos shifted from ‘development as the priority’ through the economic 
devolution of Deng Xiaoping to the ‘scientific approach to development’ through the 
regulatory consolidation of Hu Jintao. These changes paved the way for establishing 
regional governance. The emphasis on ‘new urbanization’ under the current Chinese 
leadership (particularly Premier Li Keqiang) requires a regional approach to urban 
and rural development, rather than treating them as separate issues. The develop-
ment of city-region governance thus represents an effort to fill the regulatory control 
gap in the peri-urban areas and in-between urban spaces.
— The formation of city-region governance
However, the development of city-regions in China reveals the strong involve-
ment of the state in the crisis management of market-oriented growth under global-
ization. The crisis of entrepreneurial governance includes but is not limited to issues 
of environmental degradation, redundant production capacities, and fragmented land 
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use and sprawl. This is contradictory to what Scott (2001) described as the driver 
of globalization and regional economies. As a result of this crisis of entrepreneurial 
governance, regional coordination has become a major priority on the government’s 
agenda. The problems associated with inter-city competition are being recognized 
by both the competitive local states and by the central government, which has led to 
the emergence of regional governance. Recently, regulatory control over urban land 
development has been strengthened (Xu et al., 2009)––for example, ‘basic agricultural 
land’ is thus designated to protect it from encroachment by urban development. Some 
regional plans have been set up to achieve better coordination between cities (Wong 
et al., 2008)––for example, a new urban and rural spatial development plan has been 
drafted for the Beijing–Tianjin–Hebei region, with a special section on sustainable 
development. These regional plans reflect a return to a concern with the public interest. 
In the field of urban planning, the central government sends planning inspectors and 
auditors down to local governments to check their implementation of urban plans. This 
suggests that the central government is striving to monitor local practices, as local 
gov ernments have often found tactics for evading central control. For example, to 
circumvent the protection of basic agricultural land, they invented various ways to 
manipulate the quota of developable land (Yang and Wang, 2008) by finding poor land 
in other places to replace lost basic agricultural land. Through this swap, the loss of 
agricultural land did not show up in the land assets balance sheet.
Because of the alarming environmental crisis, the issue of sustainability started 
appearing on the agenda of regional policymakers and planners. Confronted with envi-
ronmental challenges, planners started to reconsider the objectives of urban and 
regional planning. There have been growing appeals to change the objectives of plan-
ning from promoting purely economically oriented targets to fostering sustainable 
development. The new sustainability agenda has begun to justify the need for spatial 
plans beyond individual cities. This is particularly salient in the spatial plans for larger 
regions such as the PRD Urban Cluster Coordination Plan and the YRD Regional 
Plan. While previous regional plans in the 1950s and 1960s were mainly aimed at 
reducing regional inequalities between the coastal, central and western regions, these 
new city-region plans emphasize coordination between cities in the city-region to 
ensure environmental sustainability. This new objective differs significantly from the 
promotion of competitiveness under entrepreneurialism.
In addition to changing objectives, there is also the upward trend of rescaling of 
governance towards the regional scale (Yeh and Xu, 2010). However, this superregional 
scale is not workable because of the constraints of the political and administrative sys-
tem. Politically, the superregion would be too big and too powerful, and administratively, 
it misses a tier of government. The city-region seems to be a compromise, as it is based 
on the central city but also on a system of settlements and economic development 
zones that promote the area’s competitiveness. Government planners recognize that 
the failure of previous regional policies was in part attributable to the downscaling of 
governance to individual cities (Wu and Zhang, 2010). Under economic devolution, GDP 
growth targets were allocated to local governments, which were required to fulfil their 
targets, and whose performance was assessed accordingly. Government officials were 
promoted according to their achievement of GDP growth targets (Chien and Gordon, 
2008). Local governments were also offered discretionary incentives. Such downscaling 
hindered inter-city cooperation, as each locality raced to the bottom and wanted to 
develop its own base for growth (Chien and Gordon, 2008). To cope with the problems 
created by decentralization and increasing regional inequalities, the scale of the city-
region became the new form of state spatial selectivity since the mid-2000s. In the next 
section, I examine the concrete mechanisms that led to the development of city-region 
governance.
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the mechanisms of Chinese city-region governance
— Administrative annexation and metropolitanization
The Chinese government’s administrative system was remarkably stable over 
the imperial period until the era of economic reform. Initially, in the 1980s, administra-
tive boundaries were adjusted to strengthen the central city. This change served the 
purpose of opening up development spaces for the core city. Counties were annexed 
into the territories of central cities under the city-leading-counties system (Ma, 2005). 
As a result of counties being assigned to central cities, the central cities were able to 
use their hinterland to strengthen their resource base. Under the ‘city leading counties’ 
system, the county retained its county status. In the 1990s, a new practice led to the 
conversion of counties to ‘urban districts’. This was a major change, as the county was 
a rural administrative unit, while the city was an urban government. The conversion 
from county to city status raised the standard of infrastructure provision in the city 
plan. In the period from 1996 to 2006, 171 counties were converted to urban districts 
(Qiu and Wang, 2011). This change usually served major cities such as those that were 
under direct jurisdiction of the central government (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and 
Chongqing), provincial capitals and sub-provincial capitals (important cities within 
a province without provincial capital status may be thus designated to enable them 
to enjoy greater decision-making capacity under direct jurisdiction of the provincial 
government). When these cities expanded their administrative areas, they usually 
absorbed nearby counties into urban districts.
During the early stages of administrative annexation, the purpose of annexing 
the counties was to support the central city. However, the policy then started aiming 
at solving inter-city conflicts. The government hoped that through annexation of the 
counties, friction between different administrative units could be reduced. For example, 
the city of Changzhou and nearby county Wujin had long been rival governments that 
strove to protect their own interests, although its built-up areas are, in fact, adjacent 
to each other. However, there was a lack of unified services for the municipal area 
and administrative division caused fragmentation of public services in the urbanized 
region. In 2001, Changzhou annexed Wujin, which then became its urban district. After 
annexation, the city of Changzhou began to provide public services to Wujin district 
(Zhang and Wu, 2006).
Planners also hoped that administrative annexation would help reduce com-
petition between the core city and nearby counties. The central state perceived admin -
istrative annexation as a way to solve problems associated with uncoordinated 
development and excessive growth in the central cities and it has therefore been used 
extensively to harmonize fragmented administrative units. For example, three districts 
in Tianjin (Tanggu, Hangu and Dagang) were merged into Binhai district in 2009. 
Similarly, Pudong district of Shanghai annexed Nanhui district to create vast areas 
for development. Xiamen and Shenzhen, two special economic zones, extended the 
boundaries of their special economic zones to cover the whole municipal territory. In 
2010, four urban districts of Beijing were merged into two districts. The purpose of the 
merger was to expand the influence of two well-developed urban districts (Xicheng 
district and Dongcheng district) to two old urban districts (Chongwen district and 
Xuanwu district). The adjustment of administrative boundaries helped to link these 
units in the metropolitan region, with the effect of consolidating their metropolitan 
governance.
Administrative annexation facilitates the process of metropolitanization, as it 
expands the tax base of the central city, thus enabling the central city to pull financial 
resources together from nearby counties to initiate mega development projects. The 
policy of administrative annexation thus improves the ‘regional competitiveness’ of the 
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whole city-region, as competition between central cities is also competition between 
their city-regions. Because of the hierarchical political system, Chinese administrative 
annexation is not a result of local social movements but rather originates from a 
jurisdictional review by the upper levels of government, and is approved by the central 
state.
— Spatial plans and strengthened coordination by the central state
In the socialist period, individual cities prepared their urban master plans 
to guide general land use patterns. Later, under urban entrepreneurialism, the local 
government prepared ambitious plans to expand its built-up areas (Wu and Zhang, 
2007). These expansionist plans no longer followed the technical requirements of a 
statutory master plan. Rather, they reflected the thrust for urban expansion and were 
aimed at enhancing the status of the central cities. For example, the 2002 Guangzhou 
Conceptual Plan envisaged the dramatic expansion of Guangzhou towards the south in 
the PRD. The plan, prepared at the request of local government, gave little considera-
tion to inter-city cooperation. From the mid-2000s, the central state began to create a 
newly invented spatial plan to strengthen regulatory coordination in its city-regions. 
Adopted at the scale of subregional and urban clusters, these spatial plans focused on 
spatial structure rather than on concrete land use. They were prepared for densely 
populated regions such as the YRD, the PRD, Jing-Jin-Ji, as well as other regions.
For example, Jiangsu province prepared the Yangtze River Industrial Belt Plan 
(Jiangsu) and the Suzhou, Wuxi and Changzhou Regional Plan (Luo and Shen, 2008). 
The PRD Urban Cluster Coordination Plan was led by the Ministry of Housing and 
Urban–Rural Development (MOHURD), and the YRD Regional Plan was initiated 
by the NDRC. The PRD Urban Cluster Coordination Plan envisaged that the region 
should adopt a spatial structure consisting of ‘one core area, three belts and five axes’. 
By creating a spatial structure, urban sprawl in the region could be prevented. A new 
governance form was proposed to accompany the new spatial structure. A planning 
ordinance was set up to enforce land protection. The plan also designated various 
spatial policy zones to implement coordination mechanisms. Rather than being driven 
by a bottom-up entrepreneurial thrust, these spatial and regional plans were prepared 
in a top-down manner, reflecting national concerns over sustainability, urban–rural 
integration and a harmonious society (Li and Wu, 2013)––environmental and social 
issues that justified the need for high-level state intervention.
A new type of spatial plan is the ‘main functional area plan’ (zhuti gongnengqu 
guihua), which was prepared through a system of development and reform commissions 
since 2005 and has been applied to major city-regions. For example, the municipality of 
Beijing under the direct jurisdiction of the central government has a status equivalent 
to a province, while the districts of Beijing municipality are equivalent to counties. 
The main functional plan of Beijing divides the whole territory of Beijing municipality 
into four specific functional areas: the capital core functional area, the urban extended 
functional area, the urban new development area, and the ecological containment and 
preservation area. The plan aims to create a functional division of the metropolitan 
region, which strengthens the coordination of city-region governance.
Rather than fostering the competitiveness of individual cities, the urban cluster 
plan aims to enhance coordination between cities in their city-region. According to 
Xiaojiang Li, former president of the China Academy of Urban Planning and Design 
(CAUPD), a leading planning institution in China, ‘The Seventeenth CCP Congress 
officially adopts the concept of urban clusters … The central government recognizes 
the need to intervene in the development and uses the urban clusters to set up the 
necessary coordination mechanism’ (Li, 2008: 5).1
1 Extract translated from Chinese by the author.
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The YRD Regional Plan envisages that the YRD region will consist of inter-
locking city-regions. The structure is specified as ‘one city (Shanghai) and nine axes’ 
and the plan specifies the functional division of 16 cities in the YRD region. Shanghai 
is designated a global city with advanced and comprehensive services, while other 
cities, such as Nanjing, Suzhou, Wuxi, Hangzhou and Ningbo, are granted the status 
of subcentres. Shanghai is tasked with developing finance, marine logistics and other 
producer services, while Hangzhou, as the southern wing, is to focus on cultural 
industries, tourism and leisure, and the electronics business, and Nanjing, as the 
northern wing, is to become the gateway city to the middle and western regions of 
China. Nanjing is also to develop advanced manufacturing and producer services, 
as well as become a centre for science and technology. The YRD Regional Plan was 
approved by the central government in 2010. In fact, the plan was largely formulated 
and implemented by the central government rather than the municipal governments. 
Through functional designation, the central government hoped that vicious inter-city 
competition could be avoided in future.
— Regional institutions and inter-city collaboration
Efforts to build regional institutions in the early stages of economic reform 
failed because the dominant trend at that time was decentralization. For example, in 
1982, the State Council decided to set up the Shanghai Economic Region (SER), which 
included ten cities in the YRD. In 1986, the SER was expanded to include five provinces 
and the municipality of Shanghai. In 1982, the office prepared a regional develop-
ment strategy and the regulation of the SER, wishing to initiate the treatment of Taihu 
Lake. However, against the trend of economic decentralization, the office could not 
achieve coordination between the various cities in the region and it was abolished in 
1988.
Despite the failed setting up of the SER, Shanghai continued to maintain some 
linkages with other cities in the region through various joint meetings. In 1992, joint 
meetings of senior officials in the economic commissions of the cities in the YRD 
were set up. In 1996, the Coordination Association of Urban Economies in the YRD 
was estab lished (Wu and Zhang, 2010). The mayors of these cities are members of 
the associa tion (Luo and Shen, 2009), which aimed to promote cooperation in  trans-
port,  tourism and human resources management. In 2000, the Forum of Economic 
Collabo ration bet ween Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang formed a channel of commu-
nication between senior officials of these provincial-level governments (Luo and 
Shen, 2009; Wu and Zhang, 2010). Since 2005, collaboration has focused on compre-
hensive  transport, science and technology development, energy, and environmental 
protection.
The case of the YRD shows that large-scale regional coordination has been dif-
ficult in China. The Office of Western Development and the Office of Revitalization of 
Northeast Old Industrial Bases were not able to play their roles and had to be absorbed 
into the State Council. The only practical way to set up regional collaboration seemed 
to be through city-based linkages. In essence, the role of the city-region has become 
increasingly important, as regional collaborations are basically achieved through 
collaboration between central cities.
Inter-jurisdictional cooperation has been driven by the practical need to develop 
cross-jurisdiction infrastructure (Li et al., 2014) to organize public services in the city-
regions and to enforce environmental protection at a regional scale, for example, shared 
water systems. In the PRD, the mayors of five county-level cities along the Tangjiang 
River signed an agreement to protect water quality in the river basin (Li, 2008). Similarly, 
Guangzhou, Foshan and Dongguan in the PRD collaborated in the development of the 
regional rail system (Li et al., 2014). Shenzhen and Dongguan managed to coordinate 
waste treatment and the development of road systems. Collaboration is also required 
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because infrastructure investments now come from different sources than in a single 
city.
Beijing had to develop a collaborative relationship with Tangshan, another city 
in the region, because of the relocation of Capital Steel from Beijing to Caofeidian in 
Tangshan and the port of Tangshan serving the city-region. In Hunan province, the 
provincial government encouraged three major cities, Changsha, Zhuzhou and Xiang-
tan (also known as Chang-Zhu-Tan), to share responsibility for the provision of services, 
for example, postal services, telecommunications, banking and regional transport, 
with the objective of providing standardized services to all three cities as if they were 
a single city. In the YRD, the development of a 15 + 1 model has stimulated tourism 
cooperation and inter-city collaboration in public transport development. In Fujian 
province, Xiamen, Quanzhou and Zhangzhou have begun to form a regional association 
that serves to protect the ecological quality of two rivers in the region, to collaborate on 
the Xia-Quan-Zhang cross-sea bridge and to develop the coastal transport corridor and 
high-speed train from Xiamen to Fuzhou.
The governance of city-regions remains based on the collaboration of individ-
ual cities. For example, the two cities of Jiangying and Jingjiang reached an agreement 
to jointly create a development park, known as the Jiangying Development Zone 
Jingjiang Park (Luo and Shen, 2009). The park is located in the city of Jingjiang but 
is managed jointly by the two cities. The joint project indicates a closer form of  col-
laboration between two local governments over a physical space. However, no govern-
ment body has been set up for the park. Collaborations between cities are more or 
less based on joint meetings of local governments. In contrast to rising political 
regionalism (Park, 2013), China is still characterized by a strong central state and civil 
society remains under-developed. There is no electoral mechanism to strengthen the 
identity of city-regions, and there is no intermediate layer between the central state 
and provincial government, which means it is difficult to coordinate cities beyond 
provincial boundaries. In this case, the interlocking city-regions in the Beijing–Tianjin– 
Hebei and the YRD regions exceed their provincial boundaries and hence coordina-
tion remains difficult and fraught with problems.
Conclusion
The established wisdom of post-reform Chinese governance is economic decen-
tralization (Wong, 1991; Walder, 1995; Zhang 1999). Research on the central–local 
dichotomy reveals the role of the local state in economic governance (Zhang, 1999) 
and the rise of entrepreneurial urban governance (Zhang, 2002; Wu, 2003; Chien and 
Gordon, 2008; Ye, 2014). The thesis of the rescaling of urban governance in Western 
market economies (Brenner, 1999; 2004) is generally applicable to this process, as 
similar studies demonstrate its applicability in non-Western contexts, although studies 
of non-Western economies expanded the scope and revealed specific, locally contin-
gent politics of rescaling (Park, 2013). In the West, emerging city-regionalism tends 
towards competitive city-regions (Harrison, 2007). Jonas and Ward (2007: 176) argued 
that ‘the emergence of city-regions [is] … the production of a particular set of economic, 
cultural, environmental and political projects, each with their own logics’. Emerging 
city-regionalism corresponds to the politics of distribution as ‘politically constructed 
through state-orchestrated processes of redistribution and social provision’ (Jonas, 
2012: 822). This article highlights the recent recentralization of, for example, land man-
agement, towards the central government (Xu et al., 2009) and the upscaling of gov-
ernance towards city-regions (Lin, 2009; Luo and Shen, 2009; Wu and Zhang, 2010; 
Li and Wu, 2012a). This article contributes to the debate by revealing that the logics 
of Chinese city-regionalism are based on these being the state’s response to the crisis 
of economic decentralization. The article examines the mechanisms of rescaling and 
provides a periodization of Chinese state rescaling (as shown in Table 2).
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There are two seemingly contradictory but, in fact, complementary logics in 
the Chinese context. First, the competitive state led to the extension of cities by 
incor porating their regions. Individual cities wished to build larger territories to be 
competitive and to compete with others. Secondly, in response to the uncoordinated 
competition and the regional problems brought about by this competition, the state 
strove to fill the regulatory deficit at the regional scale. These two logics can be 
described in detail as follows.
First, entrepreneurial thrust arising from a set of market reform conditions 
drives cities to compete, while at the same time cities have become more connected 
under globalization. Developments spilt over administrative boundaries into neighbour-
ing areas in the YRD and PRD regions. However, uncoordinated development led to 
serious economic, social and environmental problems that manifested themselves at 
the regional scale. These problems necessarily needed to be solved beyond the scale 
of individual cities. In an attempt to strengthen their competitiveness and overcome 
developmental constraints, cities have tried to create a network of cities, or, in Chinese 
idiom, to build urban clusters to enhance their developmental capacity. This logic cor-
responds to state rescaling through ‘territorialization’ (Brenner, 1999), which is driven 
by economic competitiveness.
Secondly, in response to the uncoordinated development brought about by 
inter-city competition, the state has been attempting to re-regulate the economy and 
transform the scale of governance. In particular, the city-region has been chosen as the 
appropriate scale to develop governance through the politics of regulation. A discourse 
of inter-city cooperation has thus emerged in China, as shown in recent Beijing– 
Tianjin–Hebei governance practices and the policy of ‘new urbanization’ that seeks to 
develop a new relationship between the city and its countryside, which reflects this 
endeavour in region building. More specifically, city-regions are also referred to as the 
urban clusters (although this Chinese term is only loosely defined), which contain the 
central cities and their connected settlements. However, the identification of urban 
clusters is arbitrary and not necessarily based on functional areas. Thus, this study on 
Chinese city-regionalism differs from the Western literature (Harrison, 2007; Harri-
son and Hoyler, 2014) in that it regards rescaling towards the city-region not as a 
continuation of decentralization of state governance but rather as a countermeasure 
towards localism (based on individual cities). It is not an outcome of the politics of 
distribution within the city-region (Jonas, 2012) but rather the central state’s endeavour 
to reverse decentralization and identify a specific scale (the urban cluster, or the 
networked city-regions) to impose its regulatory control. In East Asia, developmentalism 
prioritized national economic growth (Park et al., 2012). However, in the 1960s and 
1970s, regionalist politics challenged the nationalized spatial selectivity of the Korean 
developmental state (Park, 2013). Chinese state spatial selectivity has experienced a 
shift from national state space to local city-based state space and has now been rescaled 
towards the city-regions, which represent a compromise between fostering economic 
competitiveness and crisis management. A particular contribution of this article is 
that it reveals the specific state spatial selectivity in Chinese state governance beyond 
decentralization.
This article identifies three mechanisms of city-regionalism: administrative 
annex ation leading to ‘metropolitanization’; strategic regional plans for consolidating 
urban clusters; and regional institutions for enhancing inter-city coordination. First, 
administrative annexation aims to capture suburban development under metropolitan 
governance (Ma, 2005), pacify contests between adjacent administrative units (Zhang 
and Wu, 2006) and turn ‘in-between spaces’ into urban districts. These are broadly 
similar to what Young and Keil (2014) identified as the exclusion of in-between spaces 
from the strategic decision-making process of city-regional investments. Similar to 
what Boudreau et al. (2007) found in the process of metropolitanization as ‘state 
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rescaling strategy’ in Canadian cities, Chinese metropolitanization is a regulatory exer-
cise that uses the metropolitan region as a scale to manage economic development.
Secondly, the central state uses spatial plans to strengthen the coordination of 
infrastructure development through various regional plans such as the regional plans 
of the YRD (Li and Wu, 2013) and the PRD (Xu and Yeh, 2005). The Jiangsu provincial 
government prepared subregional plans––the Yangtze River Industrial Belt Plan (Wong 
et al., 2008) and the Su-Xi-Chang subregional plan (Luo and Shen, 2008)––which 
con solidated regulatory control to ensure a more ordered pattern of development.
Thirdly, regional institutions created a mechanism of coordination through 
joint meetings of mayors and various associations of local government departments 
(Zhang, 2006). The new city-regionalism in China created horizontal links between 
cities, although these are characterized by a lack of political processes that would lead 
to a necessary new government layer. Soft institutions are seen as complementary to 
strengthened regulatory control by the central state at the regional scale. Owing to the 
state-dominated development regime in China, city-regionalism has to a lesser extent 
seen collaboration between regional businesses, civic networks through the backing 
of private corporations and public policy advocacies (Jonas and Pincetl, 2006).
A growing body of literature on state rescaling in general (Brenner, 2004) and 
city-regionalism in particular (Jonas and Ward, 2007; Harrison and Hoyler, 2014; Jonas 
et al., 2014) reveals the historically contingent and geographically specific politics that 
challenged the centralized form of the national state. Studies of non-Western contexts 
contribute to the knowledge of concrete driving forces beyond globalization and local 
competitiveness (Park, 2013). Non-Western contexts reveal the complexity of the 
‘politics of distribution’, which may include different levels of growth of civil society, 
political democratization and greater concern for uneven development (Park, 2013). 
These factors are not the main driving forces in China: emerging city-regionalism 
in China reflects state-orchestrated selectivity or a new spatial fix to maintain the 
coherence of governance, because earlier economic decentralization created vicious 
inter-city competition and environmental problems. The crisis discourse legitimizes 
the recentralization of state power as well as a regional representation of the central 
state. In this regard, Chinese state dominance in governance is distinctively different 
from Western and other non-Western contexts.
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